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Abstract
In this paper, we study experimentally the information aggregation process in a
market as a function of the access to different sources of information, namely an im-
perfect, public and costless signal into a market where the participants have access to
costly and imperfect private information. Our results show that the release of public
information provokes a crowding out effect on the traders’ information demand while it
keeps constant market informativeness, but significantly reduces price informativeness.
Traders overrely on public information, which has a significant negative impact on the
overall market performance. We detect the emergence of the overrelying phenomenon,
despite the absence of an explicit incentive to the subjects to coordinate, demonstrat-
ing, therefore, that the adverse effects of releasing public information in a financial
market are more relevant than generally assumed, based on the results of previous
experiments inspired by simple coordination models. Our results pose new questions
when a regulatory institution has to decide the appropriate level of transparency of its
communication strategy.
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relying, crowding out.
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1 Introduction
The idea that the price system based on competitive markets is able to aggregate
different pieces of information dispersed in the economy dates back to the 50’s (Hayek,
1945). Economists have understood that prices, in properly designed asset markets, can
aggregate and disseminate the collection of disperse information possessed by traders,
although they not necessarily do it efficiently.
Instead of leaving the market operating alone in aggregating dispersed information,
the release of public information might constitute an option that can facilitate the ag-
gregation and dissemination process. In addition to the information hold privately by
traders, one might assume the existence of a disciplining institution that releases public
information with the target of enhancing market efficiency. Intuitively, one might think
that public information should be beneficial for market performance, if it is assumed
that it simply cumulates to the information already present in the market: in this sense,
more information is valuable for decision makers. If this is true when an economic agent
acts in isolation from others, it might not be the case when a certain strategic interac-
tion among decision makers is introduced. The theoretical literature has shown that,
in an economic system where agents have access to private information, noisy public
information might be weighted above and beyond its accuracy, possibly driving the eco-
nomic system far from fundamentals and, ultimately, damaging social welfare. Using
a beauty contest coordination game, Morris and Shin (2002) demonstrate that public
information might be considered a double edged-instrument: it conveys information on
the fundamentals of a financial asset, but, at the same time, it serves as a focal point in
coordinating the traders’ activity in a market. As a consequence, the noisiness of public
information can be amplified by the market due to the overreliance of the traders to
public information. Quoting Morris and Shin (2002), this overweighting phenomenon
can be characterized by the observation that “public and private information (might)
end up being substitute rather than being cumulative”.
Overreliance to public information has become a cause of concern to regulatory in-
stitutions. The 2008 financial crisis is a good example of such overreaction, if one takes
into account the influence that the valuation of rating agencies had on the investors’
decisions and their blind behavior in following what turned out to be a misleading
advice. Beside overrelying on ratings, it might be possible that their presence has
given to the traders fewer incentives to search for independent and alternative sources
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of information to evaluate innovative financial products. The information provided by
the rating agencies might have reduced the information gathering activity of investors,
crowding out valuable information at their disposal. In order to avoid such perverse
effects of ratings, regulatory institutions have proposed new measures to incentivize
market participants to improve their internal risk management capabilities in order to
reduce overreliance on external credit ratings. In this line, the CRA III Regulation
includes a set of measures with the objective of strengthen own credit assessment by
relevant actors and reduce the sole reliance on credit ratings (European Commission,
2009). In the US market, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2010 was approved by the US Congress to avoid the overreliance to credit
ratings by investors and institutions (Chaffee, 2010).
The release of public information is not only related to the activity of credit rat-
ing agencies, but it includes also regulatory institutions as central banks, especially
considering their forward guidance activity. In the recent years, central banks include
and promote in their research agenda the study of how public communications and
disclosure policies affect agents’ behavior and incentives. In particular, they wonder
how disclosure policies can be designed to maximize their impact on desired forms of
behavior, such as accurate pricing of risk and proper formation of expectations of in-
flation (Bank of England, 2015). In this respect, Morris and Shin (2005) illustrate with
great clarity how the central bank management of expectations might lead to adverse
effects on informational efficiency of prices. They pointed out that the central bank,
releasing public information, faces the risk of dominating the dynamics of prices if it
ignores the complex interplay between the precision of the released information and
the degree of traders’ overreliance.
Despite their potential impact and implications, the adverse effects of releasing
public information are essentially conjectures derived out of simplistic game theoretical
models based on restrictive assumption on the information set and the behavior of play-
ers. The few existing experimental evidences are based on those models and, therefore,
have limited external validity (for instance, Cornand and Heinemann, 2014; Baeriswyl
and Cornand, 2016). Such experiments definitely show that the overweighting effect
does exist, although it is milder than predicted by the theory, because of the bounded
rationality of the subjects. It has been shown (Cornand and Heinemann, 2014), in
fact, that in this kind of experiments the overweighting effect is maximum under fully
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rationality, significantly milder under bounded rationality. The lower-than-predicted
overreaction of subjects to public information renders this effect a second order issue
(Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2016).
The aim of our paper consists in testing experimentally whether the adverse ef-
fects of public information disclosure, namely crowding out of private information and
overweighting of public information, are general phenomena to be observed beyond the
coordination environment. Our experimental setting exhibits some features identified
by the theoretical literature as responsible for the crowding out of private information
and the traders’ overreliance on public information. We implement (i) heterogeneous
sources of information (private vs. public), (ii) endogenous private information ac-
quisition. However, we do not introduce any explicit coordination incentive to the
subjects. Despite the absence of such incentive, we demonstrate that those effects are
experimentally measurable and empirically relevant. We show that such adverse effects
have a strong negative impact on the market performance, although subjects are not
fully rational. Contrary to the present literature, it seems that, in our setting, it is
the bounded rationality of subjects one of the main features responsible for the emer-
gence of those phenomena. This is an important result which challenges the current
view, posing new theoretical as well as experimental questions to the problems of the
release of public information into financial markets. Our contribution gives a more
robust back-up to the idea that releasing public information can be harmful for the
performance of a financial market, if not properly adapted to the market conditions.
Using laboratory experiments, we investigate the impact of releasing an imperfect,
public and costless signal into an asset market where traders have access to costly and
imperfect private information about the future prospect of the asset. The introduction
of a public signal allows us to study under which conditions the presence of public infor-
mation may act as a sort of disciplining mechanism in the asset market, promoting the
aggregation of noisy information or, instead, may distort the market performance, driv-
ing the price far for the fundamentals. The main focus of our experiment is, on the one
hand, the analysis of the efficiency of prices in aggregating and disseminating informa-
tion, studying in particular whether and under which conditions the contemporaneous
presence of private and public information enhances or reduces market efficiency. On
the other hand, we study how the demand for information responds to the presence of
a public signal.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design and
Section 3 discusses the theoretical background together with the related literature.
Section 4 presents the detailed analysis of the results, divided in the analysis of in-
formation and asset market. Here we show that the crowding out and overweighting
affects are both measurable and relevant in order to account for the market perfor-
mances. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 5, with particular emphasis
to the policy implications for regulatory institutions.
2 The experimental design
Our experimental setting is similar to Hey and Morone (2004) and Ferri and Morone
(2014). Each market consists of a 3 minute trading period and it is populated by
15 subjects. At the beginning of the trading period, each subject is endowed with
1000 units of experimental currency (ECU)1 and 10 units of a risky asset that pays a
dividend D at the end of the period. The value of the dividend can be either D = 0 or
D = 10 ECU with equal probability, which is common knowledge among subjects. At
the beginning of the trading period, the value of the dividend is randomly determined
by the experimenter, but not revealed to the subjects until the end of the period
when the subject’s payoff is determined. Apart from the dividend paid out, assets are
worthless. The asset market is implemented as a single-unit double auction. During
the trading activity in each market, subjects are free to introduce their bids and asks
for assets or directly accept any other trader’s outstanding bid or ask.2 The reason
for adopting this trading mechanism is due to its competitive properties: allocations
and prices should rapidly converge to levels near the competitive equilibrium (Smith,
1982).
Parallel to the asset market, we implement an information market where, at any
moment within the trading period, a subject can purchase partially informative private
signals at a price of 4 ECU per signal (perfectly elastic supply). The purchased signals
are private in the sense that they are not observable by the others (Morris and Shin,
2002). The values of all private signals are independent realizations conditional on the
1Cash, dividend, prices and profit during the experiments were designated in experimental units (ECU)
and converted into e at the end of the session. One experimental currency unit is equivalent to 2 cents of e.
2Every bid, ask or transaction concerns only one unit of the asset, although every subject can handle as
many as desired as long as she has enough cash or assets (no short sale is allowed).
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dividend value. A subject can purchase as many signals as she wishes, as long as she
has sufficient available cash. Signals are presented to the subjects taking the value 10
or 0. More precisely, the probability of getting a signal suggesting a dividend 10 is
p when the true state of the world is D = 10 and the probability of getting a signal
suggesting a dividend 0 is q = 1− p.3 The values of p > q > 0 are common knowledge
among subjects. For example, if a subject purchases a signal whose realization is 10,
she can infer that the dividend is expected to be 10 with probability p and 0 with
probability q.
Table 1 summarizes the different treatments as well as the treatment parameters
and the number of markets.4 The treatments where traders have access only to private
information constitute our baseline treatments,5 i.e. TB(0.6) and TB(0.8). In order to
study the impact of the public information on the market performance, we introduce
the public information treatment where subjects can purchase private signals and have
free access to a public signal, namely a signal whose realization is common to all subjects
and common knowledge among them. In those treatments, a public signal is released
at the beginning of each market. As in the case of private signals, the realization
of the public signal might take the value 10 or 0 and it is positively correlated with
the dividend. For example, if subjects observe a public signal equal to 10, they can
infer that the dividend is expected to be 10 with probability P and 0 with probability
Q = 1−P .6 We aim at studying how the mere presence of public information impacts
the performance of the information and asset markets and, therefore, we do not provide
the institution releasing the public signal with any pay-off or target function. The
public signal in our setting is, in fact, a binary random variable with a given correlation
with the fundamentals and it is not emerging out of a micro-funded strategy of the
public authority releasing the signal.
The theoretical literature on coordination setting models hypothesizes the existence
of an optimal level of transparency for the public information based on the trade-off
between its informative role and its potential distortion effects (Colombo and Femminis,
3The value of p represents the precision of a single private signal.
4In TB(0.8), markets in group 1 are populated by 13 subjects. In TP (0.6,0.8), markets in group 2 are
populated by 10 subjects. The main results of the paper are not affected by the the different number of
subjects in those markets.
5The notation TB(·) indicates the baseline treatment and the corresponding precision of a single private
signal.
6The value of P > Q > 0 is common knowledge among subjects and it represents the precision of the
public signal.
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Setting Treatment p P ] of markets
Baseline
TB(0.6) 0.6 - 20
TB(0.8) 0.8 - 20
Public information
TP (0.6,0.8) 0.6 0.8 20
TP (0.8,0.8) 0.8 0.8 20
TP (0.8,0.7) 0.8 0.7 20
Common information
TC(0.6,0.8) 0.6 0.8 20
TC(0.8,0.8) 0.8 0.8 20
Table 1: Experimental design and parameters.
2008; Cornand and Heinemann, 2008; Baeriswyl and Cornand, 2014). Concerning the
optimal communication of the monetary authorities, several authors, for example Myatt
and Wallace (2014) and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2014), consider the transparency
of public information as a control variable when designing the optimal central bank
information disclosure policy. They assert that it exists an optimal level of transparency
in order to maximize the effectiveness of the communication strategy. Taking stock of
it, we implement a set of treatments with different relative precision of the public
signal with respect to a single private signal: (i) a public signal more precise than a
single private signal, TP (0.6,0.8),
7 (ii) a public signal with the same precision than
a single private signal, TP (0.8,0.8) and (iii) a public signal less precise than a single
private signal, TP (0.8,0.7).
8 Our experimental setting allows to test whether such
trade-off exists in a non-coordination environment. In particular, we can test whether,
by acting on the relative precision of public information, regulatory authorities can
enhance or mitigate the crowding out effect that a public announcement has on the
traders’ acquisition of private information and the overweighting of public information.
The theoretical literature, e.g. Morris and Shin (2002), states that is the double-
edged role of public information (providing information on the fundamentals and co-
ordinating the agents’ expectations) that might be responsible for its overweighting in
the aggregation of information, at least in a coordination setting with strategic comple-
mentarities. In order to disentangle the two elements that renders public information
a double-edged instrument, we implement the common information treatment9 where
7The notation TP (·,·) indicates the treatment with public signal; the first number indicates the precision
of the single private signal while the second number indicates the precision of the public signal.
8One should consider that each trader can buy several private signals in a way that his/her aggregate
private information might be more accurate than the single public signal.
9The notation TC(·,·) indicates the treatment with common signal; the first number indicates the precision
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subjects have free access to a common signal. We define the common signal as a signal
whose realization is common to all subjects but not common knowledge among them.
Thus, they only know that each subject receives one signal with the same precision,
but it is not known that all signals share the same realization. The common signal
is, therefore, equally informative to all traders about the dividend value, but it is not
any more a predictor of the opinion of the other traders, given that each trader does
not know that the other traders observe the same signal. As in the case of a public
signal, the common signal is released at the beginning of each trading period and it is
presented to the subjects taking the value 10 or 0 with precision P . Comparing the
results of the treatments with public and common signal allows us to better under-
stand whether it is the commonality nature of public information the main driver of its
potential distorting effect on market prices, as suggested by the theoretical literature.
The experiment is programmed using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
When the subjects arrive at the laboratory the instructions are distributed and ex-
plained aloud using a Power Point presentation. This is followed by one practice period,
so that, subjects get familiar with the software and the trading mechanism.10 Each
subject can only participate in one session. Each session consists of 10 independent
trading periods (markets).
At the end of the trading period, dividends are paid out and the subject’s profit is
computed as the difference between their initial money endowment and the money held
at the end of the period. Each subject’s final payoff is computed as the accumulated
profit in the 10 periods, and paid cash at the end of the session. The average payoff is
about 20 e and each session lasts around 90 minutes.11
3 Theoretical background and related literature
3.1 Do nothing equilibrium
Our experimental setting, similarly to Hey and Morone (2004) and Ferri and Morone
(2014), can be characterized by a “do nothing” equilibrium. If all traders are risk
of a single private signal whereas the second number indicates the precision of the common signal.
10In appendix, we show the translated screenshots of the three treatments.
11Note that subjects can make losses. To avoid some of the problems associated with subjects making
real losses in experiments, we endow all subjects with a participation fee of 3 e, which can be used to offset
losses. No subject earned a negative final payoff in any session.
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neutral or share the same beliefs and risk aversion, we should observe no transaction
in the asset market and no purchase of private signals in the information market. The
basic reasoning underlying the “do nothing” equilibrium lies in the constant-sum-game
nature of our experimental setting. Essentially, it means that a subject would have
incentives to purchase a private signal just in case he/she expects to recover the pur-
chasing cost, making profits at the expense of other traders. Knowing that, the other
traders would not trade and, therefore, the incentive for the first trader to purchase
private information disappears. As a consequence, no activity in the information as
well as in asset markets is expected.
As we will see in the results section, this theoretical equilibrium is never achieved.
Conversely, we observe a sustained level of activity in the information market as well as
in the asset market, in all treatments. This equilibrium turns out not to be empirically
relevant, leaving us with the need of considering other possible benchmarks to shed
some light on the market dynamics observed in our experiment.
3.2 Fully revealing benchmark
We introduce the fully revealing benchmark as the expected price conditional on all
information present in the market. Note that, whereas the “do nothing” prediction is
an equilibrium in a strict economic sense, the “fully revealing” is not. Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) show the impossibility of the existence of an equilibrium in a market
with fully informative prices and contemporaneously access to costly information. If
the information is instantaneously incorporated into the market price as stated by the
efficient market hypothesis (hereafter EMH), traders have no incentive to purchase pri-
vate information. However, if no trader purchases information, it immediately appears
a profit opportunity and, therefore, an incentive to gather information. Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), and the literature related to the noisy rational expectations equilibrium,
introduce an exogenous noise in order to provide incentives for the acquisition of costly
information. The presence of the exogenous noise compensates the costs of purchas-
ing information, so that, it is possible to define an equilibrium in both the assets and
the information market. Sunder (1992) shows experimentally that the fully revealing
benchmark is a reasonable predictor to describe price behavior in the asset market.
Furthermore, he suggests that the double auction mechanism creates enough endoge-
nous noise to prevent an instantaneous revelation of information, therefore, creating
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incentives for the subjects to purchase information even in absence of an exogenous
noise. Taking into account that we use a double auction as trading mechanism in the
asset market and that traders have access to costly imperfect information, we can rely
on Sunder’s results to consider the fully revealing benchmark as a possible predictor
of the level of prices in our experimental financial markets.
Let us compute the expected price conditioned all available information in the
market. Using the Bayesian inference, we compute the probability that the dividend
is equal to 10 ECU conditioned on the series of signals purchased by subjects up to
time t, which we denote as It = {s1, s2, ..., sj ..., st}. We refer to It as the market
private information set, which does not take into account the sequential order of signal
acquisition. The variable sj takes the value −1, when the signal suggests that the
dividend is worth 0 ECU, or 1, if it suggests that the dividend is worth 10 ECU.
Additionally, we introduce the variable S which takes the value 1 (−1) if the public
or common signal suggests a dividend equal to 10 (0) ECU, while it takes the value 0
when we refer to the baseline treatments, where no public or common signal is released.
We denote as Pr(D = 10|It, S) the probability of observing a dividend equal to 10
ECU conditioned on the information available at time t:12
Pr(D = 10|It, S) = Pr(It|D = 10) · Pr(D = 10|S)
Pr(It, S)
, (1)
where Pr(It, S) is the marginal probability, computed as:
Pr(It, S) = Pr(It|D = 10) · Pr(D = 10|S) + Pr(It|D = 0) · Pr(D = 0|S). (2)
Pr(D = 10|S) is the prior probability of the event D = 10 given the public signal S.13
The values of this conditional probability are defined later on.
Let us now compute the expression for the different terms of eq. (1) as a function
of:
• p, the probability that a single private signal is correct, with q = 1− p;
• P , the probability that the public or common signal is correct, with Q = 1− P .
In this sense, treatments in the private information setting, i.e. TB(0.6) and
TB(0.8), can be considered a case where the public information does not bias the
12Mutatis mutandis, the probability to observe a dividend equal to 0 ECU is Pr(D = 0|It, S) = 1−Pr(D =
10|It, S), since we have just two possible states of the world.
13Pr(D = 0|S) indicates the prior probability of the event D = 0.
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traders towards any of the two states (and therefore P = Q = 1/2), whereas in
all the other treatments the public or common signal biases the uniform prior
towards one of the states depending on the realized value.
• Nt, the number of signals in the information set available up to time t;
• nt is the number of 1s and Nt − nt is the number of -1s in the It.
In the following, when not necessary, we will omit the time variable t from the variables
nt and Nt. Depending on the value of S, the numerator of eq. (1) is given by:
Pr(It|D = 10) · Pr(D = 10|S = 1) = pn · qN−n · P ,
Pr(It|D = 10) · Pr(D = 10|S = −1) = pn · qN−n ·Q , (3)
Pr(It|D = 10) · Pr(D = 10|S = 0) = pn · qN−n · 1
2
.
The marginal probability in eq. (2) takes then form:
Pr(It, S = 1) = P · pn · qN−n + Q · pN−n · qn ,
P r(It, S = −1) = Q · pn · qN−n + P · pN−n · qn , (4)
Pr(It, S = 0) =
1
2
pn · qN−n + 1
2
pN−n · qn .
Combining eqs. (1), (2), (3) and (4), and defining Ht =
∑t
j=1 sj = 2nt − Nt as
the aggregate net private signal available at time t, we obtain the probability that the
dividend is equal to 10 as a function of the information present in the market at time
t:
Pr(D = 10|It, S) =
[
1 +
(
Q
P
)S (q
p
)Ht]−1
. (5)
Using eq. (5), the fully revealing benchmark for the asset price under risk neutrality
assumption is given by:
FRt = 10 · Pr(D = 10|It, S) + 0 · Pr(D = 0|It, S) = 10
[
1 +
(
Q
P
)S (q
p
)Ht]−1
. (6)
3.3 Overweighting of public information
Morris and Shin (2002) and Allen et al. (2006) have been the first to point out that
if higher-order expectations play a role in pricing an asset, public information will
be overweighted with respect to its precision. Morris and Shin (2002), in particular,
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illustrate the overweighting phenomenon within the framework of a beauty contest
game assuming fully rationality of players. In such a game, players make a double
account of the public information, considering its informational content as well as its
role in second guessing the expectations of the other players (commonality). Although
similar in spirit, but within a different theoretical framework, Allen et al. (2006) develop
an intertemporal asset pricing model with heterogeneous expectations where higher-
order beliefs enter into the aggregate market demand function, without an explicit
coordination motive. The fact that public information enters in all traders’ demand
function renders public information a good predictor for aggregate demand and gives
rise to the overweighting phenomenon.
Considering such effect, Morris and Shin (2005), Amato and Shin (2006) or Vives
(2014), among others, call attention to a paradox of public information in markets
where prices are the main suppliers of endogenous public information. In those markets,
the release of more precise public information might reduce the informativeness of prices
(as endogenous public signals). That is, there is a crowding out14 of exogenous public
information on endogenous public information due to the fact that the release of public
information induces traders to rely less on their private information or, conversely,
overrelay on public information. In coordination settings, public information turns out
to be overweighted with respect to its informational role, since it carries the additional
information on the beliefs of the other traders due to its commonality. Within our
laboratory financial market, we can test for the paradox of public information within
a more general framework, without any built-in coordination mechanism.
Our experimental setting exhibits the key elements suggested by the theoretical
literature based on Morris and Shin (2002) and, especially, Allen et al. (2006) in order
to observe traders’ overweighting on public information: (i) The access to private and
public information. (ii) Heterogeneous expectations due to the endogenous acquisition
of noisy private information. Additionally, if subjects consider the beliefs of other
subjects when trading, we expect to observe the overweighting phenomenon.
In order to quantify the overweighting phenomenon, let us define the public infor-
14A cautionary note is in order here. When we refer to crowding out, we consider the reduction in the
demand for private information due to the presence of an additional free signal (public or common). The
theoretical and experimental literature refers also to the crowding out of an exogenous public signal on
the informativeness of endogenous signals (prices or other statistics) (see, e.g., Amador and Weill, 2010;
Vives, 2014). In our paper, we refer to this effect as overweighting of public information in order to clearly
distinguish between the two effects.
12
mation benchmark as the expected price conditional just on the public signal:
PB = 10 · Pr(D = 10|I0, S) + 0 · Pr(D = 0|I0, S) = 10
[
1 +
(
Q
P
)S]−1
. (7)
Note that both the fully revealing benchmark of eq. (6) and the public information
benchmark of eq. (7) take into account the presence of public information. The main
difference is that, while in the fully revealing benchmark private and public information
are weighted according to their respective precisions, the public information benchmark
depends exclusively on the precision of public signal. In other words, it assigns a zero
weight to the private information in aggregating all available information. Therefore,
if the public information benchmark turns out to be a better predictor of actual prices
than the fully revealing benchmark, we are able to prove the existence of overweighting
phenomenon.
3.4 Crowding out of private information
Considering that in our experimental setting the information acquisition process is en-
dogenous and in perfectly elastic supply, we can characterize the information market
analyzing how the demand for private information varies as a function of the informa-
tion set at the disposal of the subjects.
Colombo et al. (2014), among others, propose a theoretical model that generalizes
the Morris and Shin coordination setting introducing the acquisition of costly and noisy
private information. They demonstrate the existence of a crowding out effect of pub-
lic information on the equilibrium acquisition of private information.15 The intuition
behind this result is simple: the presence of a public signal helps investors to better
forecast the fundamentals, reducing, therefore, the marginal value of private informa-
tion and, consequently, its demand. They further study the impact of the equilibrium
degree of coordination on the magnitude of the crowding out. More precisely, they show
that the higher the equilibrium degree of coordination in a strategic complementarity
setting, the higher the magnitude of the crowding out effect. Conversely, in a strategic
substitutability setting, the demand for private information increases with the degree
of coordination (crowding in). Other contributions in the area include Colombo and
15See Corollary 1 in Colombo et al. (2014).
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Femminis (2008); Demertzis and Hoeberichts (2007) and Kool et al. (2011).
Our experimental setting does not include an explicit coordination motive for the
subjects as in Colombo et al. (2014), among others. We cannot, in fact, sharply char-
acterize our setting within strategic complementarity or substitutability framework.
Nevertheless, we consider their predictions useful to shed some light on our experi-
mental results concerning the subjects’ behavior in the information market. Following
Colombo et al. (2014), we expect to observe a reduction in the acquisition of private
information whenever we introduce a free signal into the market, since it provides
information on the fundamentals. Furthermore, comparing the public and common
treatments, we can infer the role of the commonality of public information on traders’
higher-order beliefs and its impact on information demand. We hypothesize that if the
common and public treatments exhibit the same reduction in information demand, it
is the informative role of the free signal the main driver of the crowding out effect.
Significant differences, instead, point to the existence of a strategic interaction among
subjects in the acquisition of information (see Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009).
4 Results
Figures from 5 through 18, included in the Appendix, display the trading activity
in all markets for all treatments. Each panel of those figures refers to one particu-
lar market. A simple inspection of the market activity shows that the “do nothing”
equilibrium is not a meaningful description of the subjects’ trading behavior in any of
the implemented treatments. This empirical finding is in line with many experiments
on laboratory financial markets characterized by “no-trade equilibrium”. Several re-
cent papers study under which conditions subjects do trade in the laboratory despite
the theoretical incentives not to do so (Angrisani et al., 2008; Carrillo and Palfrey,
2011). They essentially show that subjects fail to consider the strategic implications of
trading within an asymmetric information environment. The failure of “do nothing”
equilibrium speaks in favor of a certain degree of bounded rationality of the subjects.
In the following, we present our results focusing on how the access to public infor-
mation impacts the information and the asset market.
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4.1 Information demand and market informativeness
A crucial aspect of our experimental design is that the demand for private information is
endogenous in a market with perfectly elastic supply. Therefore, in order to characterize
the information market, it is sufficient to analyze the demand for private information.
We define the demand for private information as the number of signals purchased by
the subjects in a given market.
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Figure 1: Per capita demand for private information per market across treatments.
4.1.1 Crowding out effect of public information on the demand for
private information
Figure 1 and Table 2 show that the release of a free signal, whether public or common,
crowds out the demand for private information, since traders substitute part of their
private information with the information provided by the public signal. This effect can
be observed in treatments with low as well as high precision of private information.
Our experiment robustly shows that the introduction of a public signal significantly
reduces the traders’ investment in private information.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in the empirical as well as
experimental literature that proves the existence of the crowding out effect of public
information on the demand for private information, demonstrating that such effect is
measurable and empirically relevant. Our results confirm the theoretical prediction of
Colombo et al. (2014) on the crowding out effect that public information exerts on the
subjects’ acquisition of private information in a coordination setting, generalizing their
prediction to a more general framework. As pointed out by Colombo et al. (2014), a
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reduction in the acquisition of private information is not per se a negative effect on
social welfare if public information compensates for the reduction in the overall market
informativeness.16
Treatments MW statistic p-value
TB(0.6) vs. TP (0.6,0.8) 3.797 0.000
TB(0.6) vs. TC(0.6,0.8) 3.523 0.000
TB(0.8) vs. TP (0.8,0.8) 3.315 0.000
TB(0.8) vs. TP (0.8,0.7) 5.063 0.000
TB(0.8) vs. TC(0.8,0.8) 5.061 0.000
TP (0.6,0.8) vs. TC(0.6,0.8) -0.474 0.635
TP (0.8,0.8) vs. TC(0.8,0.8) 2.420 0.016
TP (0.8,0.8) vs. TP (0.8,0.7) -2.211 0.027
Table 2: Mann-Whitney test (MW hereafter) for the crowding out effect of public and
common signal in the information market.
When evaluating the effect of releasing public information into a financial market it
is not only important to evaluate the impact on the demand for private information, but
also to determine its impact on the traders’ participation in the information market.
In our experiment, we observe a high degree of heterogeneity in the participation of
subjects in the information market. In particular, the role of uninformed traders, i.e.
traders who do not purchase information, can be relevant for the dynamics of the asset
market (see section 4.2.2). Bloomfield et al. (2009), for example, show experimentally
that uninformed traders provide liquidity to the market, increasing market volume,
as well as reducing price informativeness.17 In order to characterize how the access
to public information affects the subjects’ participation in the information market, we
define the information market participation rate (henceforth denoted IMPR), as the
proportion of subjects who purchase at least one signal during the trading activity in
a given market (active traders). Considering the IMPR, the crowding out effect in the
per capita demand for private information can be decomposed into the combination of
two adjustments: (i) a reduction in the IMPR and/or (ii) a reduction in the demand
for private information of active traders. In order to disentangle the two possible
adjustments, Figure 2 and Table 3 illustrate that the release of a public (or common)
16Later in this paper (Section 4.1.2), we will show the effect of the crowding out on market informativeness.
17In Bloomfield et al. (2009) the information is exogenously distributed among the market participants.
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signal does not significantly affect the IMPR. Therefore, the crowding out is largely
caused by the reduction of the private information demand of the active traders. We
can summarize our findings as follows:
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Figure 2: Boxplot of the IMPR in each market across treatments.
Treatments MW statistic p-value
TB(0.6) vs. TP (0.6,0.8) 0.068 0.945
TB(0.6) vs. TC(0.6,0.8) 0.789 0.430
TB(0.8) vs. TP (0.8,0.8) 1.552 0.121
TB(0.8) vs. TP (0.8,0.7) 1.107 0.268
TB(0.8) vs. TC(0.8,0.8) 1.361 0.174
TP (0.6,0.8) vs. TC(0.6,0.8) 0.560 0.576
TP (0.8,0.8) vs. TC(0.8,0.8) -0.539 0.590
TP (0.8,0.8) vs. TP (0.8,0.7) 1.436 0.151
Table 3: MW test comparing the effect of public information on the IMPR.
Result 1: The release of public information crowds out the per capita demand
for private information: whereas it leaves largely unaffected the proportion of active
traders in the information market, it does significantly reduce their demand for private
information.
Such results are compatible with a sort of intrinsic attitude of a fraction of sub-
jects to be informed, which is affected marginally by the presence of the public signal.
Instead of not participating in the information market, they adjust their demand pur-
chasing fewer signals. Conversely, the other group of subjects does not purchase private
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signals, relying on the price chart or other market signals (e.g. bid/ask spread). This
categorization of traders resembles the dichotomy fundamentalists/chartists introduced
by Beja and Goldman (1980), afterwards developed in the literature of economic agents
with heterogeneous expectations (see for instance Lux and Alfarano, 2016; Dieci and
He, 2018).
An additional feature that we can test with our experiment is whether the com-
monality role of the public signal affects the magnitude of the crowding out or it is
rather limited to its informational role. We can test for this effect by showing how the
information demand varies between the common and public treatments. Note that in
TC(·,·), the common knowledge of the public information is absent and, therefore, the
common signal provides information just on fundamentals, without carrying informa-
tion on the other traders’ expectations. In those treatments, the crowding out is due
solely to the informational component of the free signal and not to its commonality
component.
Figures 1 and 2, and Tables 2 and 3 compare the crowding out effect in the public
and common treatments. It results that the IMPR is not affected by the commonality
of the free signal. Concerning the per capita demand, when the private information is
of low precision, the magnitude of the crowding out is unaffected by the commonality
of the signal. Differently, when private information is of high precision, the magnitude
of the crowding out is significantly higher in TC(0.8,0.8) than in the TP (0.8,0.8). It
seems that the crowding out effect depends on the commonality role of the public
signal and, additionally, on its relative precision with respect to the private signal.
How can we interpret these findings? Following Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), under
strategic substitutability of actions in a coordinating setting “agents want to know
what others do not”. The lower magnitude of the crowding out in TP (0.8,0.8) with
respect to TP (0.8,0.7) might be due to the role of the relative precision of private
information with respect to public information. When private and public signals have
the same precision, i.e. TP (0.8,0.8), an active trader has a higher incentive to purchase
private information to be more informed than the privately uninformed traders. On
the contrary, the relatively high precision of the private information in TP (0.8,0.7)
gives to active traders a lower incentive to purchase private information, as compared
to TP (0.8,0.8).
If our interpretation is correct, we can infer the existence of some strategic substi-
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tutability of the action of active traders in the information market. “Knowing what
the others do not” seems, in fact, a very reasonable behavior in a financial market.
Following this reasoning, our conjecture can also account for the significant difference
in TC(0.8,0.8) and TP (0.8,0.8). In the common information treatment, in fact, an
active trader believes to have access to a private signal.
Result 2: The information demand of active traders is extremly sensitive to the
relative precision of public information with respect to private information.
Our experimental findings indicate that the demand for information is particularly
sensitive to the relative precision of the public information. This might be an important
feature to take into account when designing communication policies. Before deciding
the transparency of the communication policy by the regulator, it would be desirable
having a proxy of the average precision of the information available to the traders, in
order to evaluate its impact on traders’ information demand.
4.1.2 The market informativeness
After having analyzed how the release of public information affects the demand for
private information, it remains an open question whether the public signal compensates
for the reduction in private information due to the crowding out effect. In other words,
is the introduction of a public signal neutral, beneficial or detrimental for the overall
market informativeness? Stated differently, does the potential of the market to discover
the true state of the world in the presence of public information remain unaffected,
enhanced or reduced? If the release of a public signal does not result to be detrimental
for market informativeness, we might speak in favor of a positive contribution of the
crowding out effect to the social value of public information. The same degree of
market informativeness can be, in fact, achieved with a reduced investment on private
information (See Colombo et al., 2014).
Let us introduce as indicator of market informativeness, the mean absolute devi-
ation between the fully revealing benchmark and the dividend value averaged during
the last minute of the trading period:18
18Note that, in principle, we should introduce an index, indicating the particular market and treatment.
We omit such index for notational convinience. The choice of averaging over the last trading minute is a
compromise between having a good statistics for market informativeness indicator and a low activity in the
information market. In the last minute, in fact, either zero or few signals are purchased and, therefore,
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MI =
1
60
180∑
t=120
|FRt −D|
10
. (8)
Recall that the definition of FRt is based on the EMH. The EMH rests on the idea
that the traders make an optimal use of all the available information, without explicitly
modeling the traders’ incentives to gather such information. Relying on the EMH
to compute the market informativeness, it might probably be a strong (behavioral)
assumption; however, it allows us not to include ad hoc behavioral rules in describing
the subjects’ trading activity. Moreover, the indicator MI can be thought as the upper
bound for the efficiency in the aggregation of available information into prices. The
higher the value of MI, the lower is the market informativeness. Instead, a value of
MI close to zero indicates that the information present in the market is sufficient to
discover the dividend value.
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Figure 3: Market informativeness across markets per treatment.
Figure 3 shows how the market informativeness is strongly affected by the precision
of the private information. When we consider a low precision of the private signal,
market informativeness is sufficient to discover the dividend value only in a few cases.19
In the majority of cases, the aggregate information provides an imprecise indication of
the true state of the world. Conversely, in the case of high precision of the private signal,
the fully revealing benchmark is almost constant over time. Moreover, traders should have enough time to
aggregate the information present in the market, giving to the fully revealing benchmark its “best shot” as
Plott and Sunder (1988) state. The results are robust to changes in the considered time interval (material
upon request). We divided by 10 in order to normalize all distances to be between 0 and 1.
19We can arbitrarily state that market informativeness is sufficient to discover the true state of the world
when MI < 0.05. Different values of this threshold do not change the essential message that the information
is sufficient to discover the dividend value in just few cases.
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the indicator MI is very close to zero in almost all cases, signaling that the information
present in the market is always sufficient to discover the dividend value, regardless of
the realization of the public (or common) signal.20 The market informativeness is just
marginally influenced by the presence of the public signal and its specific realization.
Despite the crowding out effect on the demand for private information, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the market informativeness is not significantly affected by the
release of a public signal, independently of its precision.21 This means that within the
framework of the EMH, the additional information provided by the exogenous public
signal is sufficient to fully counterbalance the effect of the crowding out on private
information.
Result 3: The crowding out effect of public information leaves invariant market
informativeness.
Our experimental analysis on the information market, summarized by Results 1
and 3, confirms the theoretical conjectures of many authors (for instance, Colombo
et al., 2014) on the role of public information in competitive markets. In an economy
with an endogenous information structure, the release of a public signal may crowd out
private information, so that public and private information turns out to be substitutes,
rather than cumulatives. Public information might just partially compensate for the
crowding out of private information, leading in some cases to a significant reduction in
the overall market informativeness.
The implications of our findings are important for regulators: the release of public
information might not increase the overall market informativeness. The intervention
of the public institutions reduces traders’ effort to gather private information at a level
that the loss in private information is not compensated by the presence of the public
signals. When introducing a new source of public information in a market, in fact, the
regulator should pay particular attention to its complex interaction with other sources
of information already at the disposal of market participants.
20Except for one market in TP (0.8,0.8), market informativeness always satisfies the condition MI < 0.05.
21A MW test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal market informativeness if we compare the baseline
treatments with all other treatments.
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4.2 Asset market and price informativeness
Until now, we have presented our experimental findings that releasing public informa-
tion has on the information market. Result 3 shows that the public signal compensates
for the crowding out effect on the demand for private information, leaving invariant
market informativeness. However, how does the release of public information effec-
tively impact the aggregation of available information into prices? Can we observe
the overweighting phenomenon of public information as predicted by the theoretical
literature? Can we preserve the beneficial effect of releasing public information, while
minimizing its adverse effects?
4.2.1 Overweighting of public information
In this section, we present the results of the impact of releasing a public signal on the
market performance in aggregating the available information into prices. Essentially,
we analyze how the information disseminated among subjects (market informativeness)
is aggregated into prices (price informativeness). According to the EMH in its strong
form, we should observe that the market price reflects all available information, so that
our measure of price informativeness should be a mere reflection of market informa-
tiveness. Taking into account Result 3, therefore, the price informativeness should not
be affected by the release of the public signal.
As a measure of price informativeness, we consider the difference between what
traders have done in a given market and what they could have done in aggregating
information into prices. In order to analyze how prices reflect all available information
in a given market, we evaluate how the fully revealing benchmark FRt, introduced in
Section 3, accounts for market prices. We compute the absolute distance of prices,
labeled as PRt, from FRt averaged in the last minute of trading activity in a given
market:22
PI =
1
60
180∑
t=120
|FRt − PRt|
10
, (9)
where the subscript t denotes seconds. The maximum level of price informativeness
is reached when PI = 0 (PRt ≈ FRt), i.e. when market prices reflect correctly all
22We consider only the last minute for the same reasons explained in footnote 18. We have normalized
the distance PI in eq. (9) to be bounded to 1. We omit the market index for notational convinience.
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available information. Significant deviations from this lower bound, instead, indicate
a reduction in price informativeness. Recall that in the fully revealing benchmark, all
information, private or public, is weighted according to its precision. In order to study
the effect that releasing public information has on how private and public information
are weighted when actually aggregated into market prices, we introduce an indicator
to measure the goodness of fit of the public benchmark. The indicator is the averaged
distance of market prices from the public information benchmark:
PP =
1
60
180∑
t=120
|PB − PRt|
10
, (10)
where PB is defined in eq. (7).23 When the indicator PP is close to zero, PP ≈ 0,
means that market prices fluctuate around the public information benchmark. The
indicator of eq. (10) helps us to detect the overweighting phenomenon and to measure
its magnitude.
The comparison of the relative performance of the indicators PI and PP in describ-
ing market prices can help us to evaluate whether deviations from fully informative
prices are systematically favoring public information, as suggested by several theo-
retical models in the literature (e.g. Allen et al., 2006). When the PP indicator is
significantly lower than the PI indicator means that the public information benchmark
better accounts for the price dynamics than the fully revealing benchmark. Given that
public information alone contributes just partially to the market informativeness (see
Figure 3), this condition indicates that the market weights public information well
beyond its informational content, being the main determinant of the price level.24
We analyze now how releasing public information impacts price informativeness in
our laboratory financial market. Figure 4 (a) and Table 4 show that in those markets
where traders have access to private information with low precision, releasing a more
precise public signal strongly reduce price informativeness with respect to the baseline
treatment, i.e. TB(0.6) vs. TP (0.6,0.8). A similar effect on price informativeness is
observed when traders have access to more precise private information (see Figure 4 (b)
23As for the indicator in eq. (9), we omit the market index for notational convinience. The indicator PP
is also normalized to 1. Although PB is constant over time, in eq. (10), we also average during the last
minute of trading activity in order to compare both indicators.
24Note that such condition is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for detecting the overweighting
phenomenon. In principle, we cannot exclude the presence of overweighting of public information even in
the case of PI lower than PP .
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Figure 4: Performance of price informativeness indicator (PI) and public information indi-
cator (PP) across markets per treatment.
PI
Effect Treatments MW statistic p-value
Releasing public information
TB(0.6) vs. TP (0.6,0.8) -2.597 0.009
TB(0.8) vs. TP (0.8,0.8) -3.949 0.000
TB(0.8) vs. TP (0.8,0.7) -1.731 0.083
TP (0.8,0.7) vs. TP (0.8,0.8) -2.732 0.006
Releasing common information
TB(0.6) vs. TC(0.6,0.8) 2.597 0.009
TB(0.8) vs. TC(0.8,0.8) 1.082 0.279
Public vs. common information
TP (0.6,0.8) vs. TC(0.6,0.8) 3.760 0.000
TP (0.8,0.8) vs. TC(0.8,0.8) 3.544 0.000
Table 4: MW test to compare values of PI indicator among treatments.
Treatments PI vs. PP
p-value
Baseline treatments
TB(0.6) 0.041
TB(0.8) 0.000
Public information
TP (0.6,0.8) 0.000
TP (0.8,0.8) 0.041
TP (0.8,0.7) 0.012
Common information
TC(0.6,0.8) 0.263
TC(0.8,0.8) 0.002
Table 5: Signtest to compare PI and PP indicators. The numbers in bold signal that the
PP indicator is significantly lower than the PI indicator.
and Table 4). If we compare TP (0.8, 0.7) with the baseline treatment, the deterioration
of price informativeness is weaker but still present (at least at 10% confidence level).
Result 4: Releasing public information in a market where traders have access to
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costly private information worsens price informativeness, in some cases, at an impres-
sive magnitude.
Our result suggests that price informativeness is not a mere reflection of market
informativeness. Contrary to what the EMH states, the aggregation of information
into prices depends on the nature of the information present in the market (private or
public) and the spectrum of information sources at the disposal of the traders.
Why do we observe a deterioration of price informativeness when a public signal is
released? We can interpret our experimental results relying on the theoretical literature
on overweighting of public information in coordination settings. In those models, the
reduction in price informativeness is consequence of the overreliance of subjects on
public information because of its commonality property, so that individual actions
systematically overweight public information more than justified by its informational
content. Under the hypothesis that subjects overrely on public information, we expect
that market prices in our experiment are heavily influenced by the public signal. We
should observe, therefore, that the PP indicator is significantly lower than the PI
indicator in our data. Figure 4 and Table 5 show that our conjecture is confirmed
when the public signal is at least as precise as a single private signal, i.e. in TP (0.6,0.8)
and TP (0.8,0.8). In those treatments, the public signal is unambiguously overweighted
since it constitutes the main determinant of the price level. When subjects have access
to less precise public information than a single private signal, i.e. in TP (0.8,0.7), we
cannot exclude that public information is overweighted. However, it is not anymore
the main determinant of the price level. It is the fully revealing benchmark, in fact,
that better accounts for the market prices. In this case, both, private and public
information, contribute to the determination of the price level.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first contribution in the literature in
observing and measuring the overweighting of public information in a non-coordination
setting. Once again, we stress the importance of having generalized such phenomenon
to a more realistic environment, proving its robustness and empirical relevance.
Many theoretical contributions in the literature suggest that it might exist a trade-
off for regulatory institutions, like central banks, between providing a precise public
information to traders in order to take more informative actions and the risk that
traders overrely on the public signals. Transparency of public information becomes,
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then, a control variable in the designing of an optimal disclosure policy.
Our experimental findings suggest that the magnitude of the overweighting effect
is strongly influenced by the relative precision of the public signal with respect to the
precision of a single private signal. Interpreting the relative precision of the public
signal as its transparency, our results speak in favor of the possibility of acting on the
relative precision of the public signal to reduce the overweighting effect.
Figure 4 and Table 5 illustrate how lowering the level of transparency, i.e. moving
from TP (0.6,0.8) to TP (0.8,0.8) and, then, to TP (0.8,0.7), the magnitude of the over-
weighting effect is significantly reduced. Interestingly, in TP (0.8,0.7), the public signal
is not anymore the main driver of market prices.
Result 5: Depending on its transparency, public information is overweighted when
incorporated into the price. Lowering transparency reduces overweighting of public in-
formation.
Our experimental findings generalize previous theoretical and experimental contri-
butions on the role of transparency to an environment beyond the coordination setting.
Our results provide a robust back up to the conjecture that acting on the transparency
of public information constitutes an effective control instrument at disposal of regula-
tors.
4.2.2 The double-edged nature of public information
In order to interpret the overweighting phenomenon in light of the existing theoretical
literature, we rest on the idea that subjects overrely on public information when decid-
ing their trading strategy. Implicitly, we assume that subjects’ higher-order beliefs play
a role when deciding at what price to trade. In particular, Allen et al. (2006) show that
such condition necessarily leads to overweight public information when information is
aggregated into prices.
It is not an easy task to directly test whether subjects actually overrely on public
information. In order to indirectly test for the overreliance hypothesis, therefore, we
implement the common information treatment, where a common signal provides infor-
mation on the fundamentals without influencing the higher-order beliefs of subjects,
since it is not common knowledge. The released signal, not being public, should lose
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its role as coordination device, and, being informative, should favor price convergence
towards the fully revealing benchmark. Thus, with the introduction of the common
information treatment, we can disentangle how the commonality and the informative
features of the public signal impact the aggregation of information into prices. If
traders overrely on public information, we expect to observe that the overweighting ef-
fect disappears or, alternatively, it is strongly attenuated when comparing the common
information and the public information treatment.
Figure 4 and Table 4 show that the release of a common signal in TC(0.6,0.8) and
TC(0.8,0.8) significantly improves price informativeness compared to the markets where
public information is released, i.e. in TP (0.6,0.8) and TP (0.8,0.8), respectively. More-
over, the common signal improves price informativeness even with respect to TB(0.6).
In the case of the private information with high precision, TB(0.8) and TC(0.8,0.8),
price informativeness does not improve being already at its (almost) maximum level.
We do not observe a distorting effect of the common signal on price informativeness.
The most striking result concerns the overweighting effect. In all treatments in the
common information setting, the overweighting effect is strongly attenuated. Prices
turn out to be more informative since, contrary to the public information treatment,
the fully revealing benchmark performs by far better than the public information bench-
mark in describing market prices. Even more, in TC(0.8,0.8), the overweighting effect
disappears since prices converge, in most cases, to the dividend value (PI close to zero).
Our results confirm that it is the commonality property of the public signal the
main responsible for its distorting effect on prices due to the traders’ overreliance on
public information in the process of aggregating information into prices. Our findings
support the intuition of Morris and Shin in defining public information as a double-
edged instrument, helping aggregation and enhancing coordination.
Result 6: The overweighting of public information is a consequence of traders’
overreliance on the public signal because of its commonality property.
Once the commonality feature is eliminated, the common signal does not constitute
the main driver of market prices. Contrary to the public signal, the common signal cu-
mulates to the private information when aggregated into the prices, without distorting
the aggregation process.
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Since we do not provide subjects with any explicit coordination motive as in Morris
and Shin (2002) and the experimental studies based on their model,25 let us introduce a
simple qualitative idea on how our financial market framework could give the incentive
to forecast the other traders’ expectations, providing a relevant role for higher-order
beliefs in the price formation mechanism. More specifically, if a trader purchases private
information that tells him that with some probability the asset dividend is 10, he would
be willing to buy assets at any price equal or lower than his expected dividend.26
He will have higher gains from trade the lower the asset purchasing price. If this
trader thinks that the market is populated by a non-marginal fraction of uninformed
traders,27 he has an incentive to bid at a price around what he expects it would be
the expectation of the group of uninformed traders, that is, the public information
benchmark. Uninformed traders could be willing to buy and sell their assets around
their expected dividend, determined solely by the public signal. If the proportion
of uninformed traders willing to trade is high enough to provide sufficient liquidity
and/or assets, market prices fluctuate around the expected dividend conditional on
the public signal. In this case, the public information benchmark better predicts the
market price than the fully revealing benchmark. Prices do not reflect the traders’
private information, but mostly the expectations of uninformed traders’ expectations
that are biased towards public information. This couple be a simple mechanism behind
the overweighting of public information, based on the impact of public information on
the traders’ second-order beliefs. Further research will be necessary to investigate the
microstructure of this process.
It is evident that our simple idea relies heavily on the bounded rationality of the
traders. The overweighting effect has been introduced as an equilibrium outcome of
coordination models with fully rational agents, as in Morris and Shin (2002). Cor-
nand and Heinemann (2014) is the only contribution in the literature that analyses
the impact of different degrees of rationality on the overweighting phenomenon, within
the boundedly rational behavioral framework introduced by Nagel (1995). They show
that the higher is the level of boundness in rationality, measured as a reduction in the
degree of inductive reasoning, the lower is the overweighting phenomenon. Instead, we
25See Cornand and Heinemann (2014) and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2014), among others.
26His expected dividend is higher than the public information benchmark, independtly of the realization
of the public signal.
27In this context, we define uninformed traders as those traders who do not purchase any signal.
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observe, in a certain sense, the opposite relationship between the level of rationality
and the overweighting of public information. In our setting, fully rationality implies
either no-trade equilibrium or, if such equilibrium is broken, a noisy rational expecta-
tion equilibrium, following the reasoning of Sunder (1992). In both cases, we should
not observe the overweighting effect, since either we have no price or it reflects the
information according to its precision. Therefore, detecting this effect as a relevant
experimental result seems to be connected to the bounded rationality of the subjects.
Our findings on the role of bounded rationality in the emergence of the overweight-
ing effect as a non-equilibrium outcome confirm again the empirical relevance of such
distorting effect of public information on prices.
At the aggregate level, subjects in our experimental markets (might) overrely on
public information with respect to private information. Since we do not explicitly
introduce a coordination setting, our experimental results generalize their main con-
clusions, showing that they can be also applied to a more general financial market
setting. It would be interesting, then, to investigate which are the minimal conditions
for the emergence of such complex interplay between private and public information in
financial markets along the lines sketched in our simple example. We leave this as an
issue for our future research agenda.
In the literature, there are several elegant frameworks to account for deviations
from fully rationality, like the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (2004) and
the coursed equilibrium of (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). In particular, Eyster et al. (2015)
apply the cursed equilibrium to a financial market, showing that public information
is overweighted when aggregated into market prices. Our experimental results can be
cast into those theoretical frameworks, providing an alternative explanation to the phe-
nomenon of overweighting of public information in financial markets within bounded
rationality of traders. The differences between our results and the existing literature
deserve, therefore, further theoretical as well as experimental research.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The efficient market hypothesis, in its strong form, states that all relevant and avail-
able information is correctly incorporated into prices. However, it does not consider
how traders allocate resources to obtain information. The noisy rational equilibrium
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models and the microstructure literature illustrate how the information can actually be
incorporated into prices. The main objective of this paper is to study experimentally
the aggregation of information in financial markets as a function of the access of the
traders to different sources of information, namely costless public and costly private
information. Such informational setting has been extensively used in the literature to
model the intervention of regulatory authorities. The objective of regulatory institu-
tions when releasing public information is essentially to discipline the market, reducing
the potential negative effects of asymmetric information. According to the theoretical
literature, however, the release of public information might have adverse effects such
as overweighting of public information and crowding out of private information. In
order to study the effect of public communication and disclosure strategies of regula-
tory institutions, we have conducted controlled laboratory experiments. We propose an
experimental setting to observe the aggregation of information into prices in a simple
financial market where traders have access to costly and imperfect private information
and a “regulatory institution” releases noisy public information.
Using our simple laboratory financial market, we show that the crowding out effect
of public information and traders overreliance on public information do exist. Our
findings show that those two effects are measurable and empirically relevant, heavily
affecting the market performance. Moreover, in our experimental setting, those ef-
fects emerge without an explicit incentive for the subjects to coordinate, as in other
experimental studies reproducing the very specific Morris and Shin (2002) theoretical
framework. We can infer, therefore, that the crowding out and overreliance are most
probably more general phenomena than conjectured by the theoretical literature.
Some general warnings for regulators can be derived out of our simple set of ex-
periments. Policymakers should be aware that the release of public information might
have distorting effects on the traders effort to find alternative sources of information
and on the aggregation of information into prices. Those effects might be extremely
significant as demonstrated by the role that credit rating agencies had on the spreading
of the 2008 financial crisis. Far from being against the activity of public institutions
in releasing information to discipline financial markets, we stress the unintended ef-
fects of the complex interaction between private and public information on the market
performance.
As a policy advise we recommend that ongoing reforms on the regulation of fi-
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nancial institutions (for instance the credit rating agencies) should account for such
complex interplay, that we have identified in our experiments. In particular, they
should provide incentives for the investors (institutional and/or private) to actively
search for alternative sources of information. In order to take stock of the regulatory
advantages of releasing public information and smooth its potential adverse effects, we
give some guidelines for the design of public communication and disclosure strategies:
(i) More precise public information does not necessarily help the market to align to
the fundamentals, since public information does not cumulate but substitutes private
information due to the crowding out and overweighting effects. (ii) It is not always
optimal to reveal all the information possessed by public institutions. It might be
better to release an informative signal that it is not perceived as too precise by the
investors to avoid overreliance. In this respect it is of great importance to know the
characteristics of the private information. The level of transparency of public infor-
mation, in fact, should be tuned considering the precision of the private information
at the disposal of traders. Therefore, it is advisable to use econometric techniques
to develop some proxies for the precision of the traders’ private information, based,
for instance, on surveys data. Interestingly, if we interpret the common information
setting as a disclosure strategy, the most effective measure that we have identified to
enhance market efficiency and, at the same time, reducing the cost of gathering private
information, is whispering in the ears of investors, i.e. to spread a common information
among investors without being common knowledge. However, we understand that this
measure is unrealistic to be implemented in real financial markets.
We strongly believe that our laboratory setting can be used as a realistic testbed
in order to assess the performance of different policy instruments, without relying on
specific behavioral assumptions and/or ad hoc coordination mechanisms. Several other
measures can be also tested, like a sequential release of public information, reducing the
level of publicity, increasing the number of institutions releasing public information.
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Appendix A: Trading activity per treatment
Each panel shows the chart of transaction prices. The vertical axis shows the price
at which the trade took place and the horizontal axis shows the time (in seconds) at
which the trade took place. The first number at the caption of each panel identifies
the market and the second one indicates the value of the dividend (either 10 or 0).
The solid line is the trading price. Finally, the dotted line indicates the fully revealing
benchmark, while the dashed line indicates the public information benchmark.
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Appendix B: Experimental design
English translation of instructions as well as English translation of the computer screens
as seen by the subjects in each treatment.
Figure 19: Screenshot of baseline treatments.
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Figure 20: Screenshot of public information treatments.
Figure 21: Screenshot of common information treatments.
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